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ANDREAS PAPANDREOU’S EXILE POLITICS:
THE FIRST PHASE (1968-1970)
Stan Draenos
Abstract: Andreas Papandreou’s exile politics, following his December 1967 release 
from Averoff Prison, have stereotypically been seen as simply adopting the neo-Marxist 
ideologies associated with the Third World national liberation movements of the era. In 
narrating the initial evolution of his views on the “Greek Question” in exile, this study 
attempts to surface the underlying dynamics responsible for radicalizing his politics in that 
direction. Those dynamics reflect, on the one hand, the relentless will-to-action informing 
Papandreou’s political persona and, on the other, the political upheavals, headlined by the 
protest movement against the US war in Vietnam, in which his politics were enmeshed.
Released from prison by the Greek military dictatorship on Christmas Eve, 
1967, Andreas Papandreou flew out of Athens to exile in Paris three weeks 
later, accompanied by his wife Margaret, their four children and his mother. 
Eight months of solitary confinement had taken their toll on the junta’s most 
renowned – and in some quarters, most notorious – political prisoner. His 
Paris exile, Margaret would write a few years later, was the beginning of a 
“long, slow road back to emotional and physical recovery”.1 
Judging by his behavior, that road consisted, first and foremost, in 
pursuing the consuming public passion that imprisonment had deprived 
Papandreou of most: collective action for a cause, with himself as leader. The 
day after his arrival in Paris, he announced plans to visit the United States, 
the country of paramount importance to the “Greek Question”. He then 
began a preliminary tour by visiting Western European capitals. Choosing 
potentially supportive NATO countries, he traveled to London, Bonn, Oslo 
and Copenhagen, where he met with government officials, political parties 
and members of the Greek diaspora to gauge attitudes towards the April 1967 
coup and articulate his initial stance. In Bonn, he released a statement that 
urged Greek Gastarbeiter (nearly half a million at that point), as well as Greeks 
studying in Germany, “to put aside our platform differences and our personal 
vision of what kind of Greece we want” in order to focus on “liberating our 
1 Cf. Margaret Papandreou, Nightmare in Athens, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1970, p. 368. 
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land and reestablishing genuine democracy. Unity in the struggle for our 
enslaved citizens is the command of the day.”2 Unity, however, would turn 
out to be the most divisive issue bedeviling Greece’s exile politicians.
Arriving in Stockholm, Papandreou appeared before a packed crowd 
of Greek immigrant workers and students on February 26 to announce 
the formation of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (known as PAK, 
the acronym for Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα), a coordinating 
committee for resistance activities, which, he declared, “has only one purpose: 
the country’s liberation”. As an early organizational statement would clarify, 
PAK “does not compete with parties. Its platform is restricted to one single 
objective: to establish in Greece [the] sovereignty of the Greek people – so 
the Greek people may choose freely among competing parties and party 
platforms in the context of a genuinely democratic process.”3 Meanwhile, 
Swedish prime minister Tage Erlander announced that PAK would receive 
financial support from his ruling Social Democratic party. Backed as well by 
strong statements of support from NATO members Denmark and Norway, 
Papandreou had driven his stake in the ground. For the next six and a half 
years, until the junta’s abrupt collapse in July 1974, PAK would be his vehicle 
for fighting Greece’s military dictatorship.
The Andreas Problem 
The creation of PAK was not quite what US officials were hoping for when 
they engineered Papandreou’s release two months before. Still, they expected 
that, in exile, Andreas would be a more manageable problem than he had 
been as a political prisoner.4 From the very night of the April 1967 coup, the 
incarceration of Papandreou, a respected, popular figure among American 
academics and Western European social democrats, had been a thorn in the 
side of the US Johnson Administration. On April 26, five days after the coup, 
Hall Saunders, head of the State Department’s Intelligence and Research 
Bureau, sent a secret memo to Walt Rostow, the president’s National Security 
Adviser, recommending that the US urge “the coup government simply to 
2 Author archive.
3 Ibid.
4 Papandreou’s “name, his ambition and his industriousness will make him a force to 
be reckoned with in the future,” observed US Ambassador Phillips Talbot, reporting from 
Athens on Papandreou’s exile activities. He nonetheless concluded that, given virtually 
unanimous hostility towards him among his political colleagues, “Andreas would 
probably have been wiser to return to the university for the indefinite future.” Talbot to 
State Department, February 2, 1968. US National Archives, College Park, MD (henceforth 
NARA), Record group 59.
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expel Andreas. No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until he is 
out of the picture,” he argued, “so expulsion would meet our domestic needs 
while at the same time being a gain for the [coup] government.”5 
The “domestic needs” Saunders cited were the product of the pressures on 
the White House from Papandreou’s wide array of politically well-connected 
friends within the American liberal intelligentsia and political world. Many 
of them – most prominently Papandreou’s Harvard mentor, John Kenneth 
Galbraith – belonged to the rising chorus of dissent within the Democratic 
Party over Johnson’s war in Vietnam. Learning he had been arrested on the 
night of the coup, Papandreou’s influential allies rallied to his cause.6 
Their lobbying was not the only factor driving the idea of getting 
Papandreou “out of the picture”. Pressures arising from the foreign policy 
bureaucracy also played into the equation. Already by early July, in the wake 
of the Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Pentagon, 
citing the now heightened “strategic importance of Greek land and air space” 
to the projection of US military power in the region, was pressing President 
Johnson to “normalize” relations with the junta, a position soon advanced 
as well by Secretary of State Dean Rusk.7 While not the only obstacle to 
“normalization”, Papandreou’s continuing confinement was, among other 
things, complicating US relations with NATO allies, such as Denmark and 
Norway, where public feelings towards the dictatorship were overwhelmingly 
hostile and Papandreou, thanks to his October 1966 pre-coup tour of 
Scandinavian countries, had become a popular hero.8 
5 Memorandum by Hal Saunders for Rostow, April 26, 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson 
Presidential Library, Austin, TX (henceforth LBJ Library). 
6 Likely of more immediate impact than Galbraith’s intervention with the Administration 
to protect Andreas from harm was a 3 am call the day of the coup by economist Paul 
Samuelson to Johnson’s national security adviser (and economics colleague). Author 
interview with Samuelson, October 16, 2002. 
7 Already, in a July 6, 1967 meeting of the “Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near 
East and South Asia” (IRG), [representatives from the State Department, the Pentagon, the 
National Security Council, the CIA and other agencies] noted that the recent Six-Day War 
in the Middle East had “dramatized” that the “availability of Greek bases [was]…virtually 
indispensable”. In light of the assessment that “the current government in Greece appears 
headed for a long stay in power”, the members of the IRG “Agreed that we should now 
move toward a normalization of our relations with Greece”. July 7, 1967 record of IRG/NEA 
meeting, classified “secret”. LBJ Library. 
8 An August 1967 report to Washington by an American observer noted that, “the intensity 
of interests [sic] in Andreas Papandreou’s case in Scandinavia is difficult to imagine” [emphasis 
in the original]; Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US–West German–Greek Relations, 
1949-74, Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen, 2006, p. 296. 
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Fig. 1. “No one believes that Greek politics can settle down until [Andreas] 
is out of the picture […]”. From an April 26, 1967 memo by Hal Saunders, 
head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
to Walt Rostow, National Security Adviser to US President Lyndon Johnson. 
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX. 
Retrieved via the Declassified Documents Reference System.
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Equally troublesome for US officials was Andreas’ American-born wife, 
the resourceful Margaret Papandreou, who, from Athens, was instrumental 
in keeping protest alive among Andreas’ supporters abroad. Shunned by 
the US Embassy9 and under heavy surveillance by the junta, she operated 
through a small network of trusted allies in the United States, including 
Stanley Sheinbaum, a peripatetic, well-heeled left-liberal activist prominent 
in the burgeoning New Left anti-war protest movement.10 In October 1967, 
Sheinbaum published a Ramparts cover story entitled “The Framing of 
Andreas Papandreou”. The article exposed how Greece’s Central Intelligence 
Agency (KYP) had fabricated key evidence used to indict Papandreou for acts 
of high treason – the junta’s justification for his continued incarceration (while 
most of his political colleagues, except for those on the severely persecuted 
left, were either conditionally free or under house arrest). With Margaret and 
her allies preparing to send highly reputed lawyers to Athens for Andreas’ 
impending trial, the junta was facing the likelihood of an international public 
relations disaster. The Johnson Administration had another good reason for 
wanting to get Papandreou “out of the picture”. 
The opportunity to do so finally appeared in December 1967. It took 
the form of King Constantine’s long-awaited counter-coup – an attempt 
to seize power back from the cabal of junior officers, led by Colonel 
Georgios Papadopoulos, which had preemptively implemented the coup 
plans of royalist generals – plans that, since November 1966, they had been 
developing at Constantine’s behest, with help of the same junior officers 
who were now their political masters. Launched on December 13, ten days 
before Papandreou’s release, the king’s poorly planned counter-coup quickly 
faltered, ending the next morning with the flight to Italy of the young 
monarch accompanied by the royal family and his puppet prime minister. 
Enabling Papadopoulos to isolate remaining pockets of opposition within the 
9 Robert Keeley, a political counselor recently arrived at the Embassy was an exception. 
Cf. his memoir, The Colonels’ Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat’s View of the 
Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece, ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy 
Series, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010, which provides an 
enlightening view of the atmosphere towards Papandreou at the Embassy.
10 The dramatic story of her struggle to obtain her husband’s release is recorded in her 
book, Nightmare in Athens; see note 1 above. Sheinbaum had helped kicked off a wave of 
revelations about illegal CIA activities at American universities in an article he wrote for 
Ramparts (April 1966) recording his experiences at Michigan State University. Cf. Angus 
Mackenzie and David Weir, Secrets: The CIA’s War at Home, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997, for a documented account of the CIA’s illegal campaign against Sheinbaum. 
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officer corps, the botched counter-coup dispelled any lingering uncertainties 
about the junta’s long-term viability. Resigning his military status as an army 
colonel, Papadopoulos stepped into the foreground to add to his existing 
portfolio the posts of prime minister and minister of defense.
With Papadopoulos now solidly in command, the Johnson Administration 
turned its attention to eliminating a final obstacle to “normalization”: 
Papandreou’s continued confinement at Averoff Prison. On December 20, 
a week after the king’s ill-fated coup, a State Department official met with 
Papadopoulos’ back channel to Washington, the nefarious Greek-American 
businessman Tom Pappas. Informed by Pappas that the “regime needed to 
know exactly what the US wanted from them in order to attain respectability 
and US understanding”, the Johnson Administration official explained that 
the “release of political prisoners, and particularly Andreas Papandreou” 
would be “a constructive step” towards bringing Greece “back to normalcy”.11 
Two days later, a delegation of European officials, accompanied by a diplomat 
from the Greek foreign ministry, visited Papandreou in his prison cell. Sent 
by the Council of Europe to investigate conditions under the dictatorship, 
the officials apparently also had Andreas’ impending release on their agenda. 
Asked what his intentions would be if he were released, Andreas declared that, 
should he “come to the conclusion that my further presence in the political 
arena might harm the smoothness of the national life of Greece, then I might 
just decide to leave politics and look after my family and my science”.12 The 
next day, on Christmas Eve, Andreas was released into the arms of his wife, 
four children and mother at their Athens home. 
Greece remained under martial law, as it would for most of the next six and 
a half years. Moreover, roughly 3000 political prisoners were still incarcerated, 
without trial, on barren islands in the Aegean.13 Nonetheless, steps to 
“normalize” relations proceeded apace. In early January 1968, Tom Pappas 
was again in Washington to deliver, through informal channels, a personal 
letter he had brought from Papadopoulos for the US president. Aiming to 
clear up “certain misunderstandings” about the “nature of the change” in 
Greece, the letter explained how the April coup had saved the country from 
the “communist menace” that would have ultimately prevailed if the May 
1967 elections had gone forward as scheduled. In any case, the regime, the 
11 Memorandum of meeting between US Deputy Assistant of State Stuart Rockwell 
and Tom Pappas, December 20, 1967, Record group 59, NARA.
12 Lagoudakis archives, unprocessed, Howard Gottlieb Archive Center, Boston 
University Library.
13 Amnesty International report, cited in Pelt, Tying Greece to the West, p. 296.
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letter explained, would soon produce a new “updated” constitution and put 
the country on the course to free elections, “rid of all the ugliness and dangers 
of the past, if this were practically possible and psychologically advisable”.14 
Four days later, the State Department sent Ambassador Phillips Talbot a 
telegram, classified secret, informing him that, “We have decided to move 
in the near future to a working relationship with the regime in Athens.” 
Then, following a “friendly, frank” meeting with Papadopoulos, Talbot 
delivered President Johnson’s reply to the dictator’s apparently reassuring 
missive. Capping the “normalization” process, Johnson’s letter thanked 
Papadopoulos for understanding the “dilemma” which the “sudden change 
of government” in April 1967 “has posed for democratic countries” and 
welcomed Papadopoulos’ pledge to “retain the basic structure of government 
which prevailed in Greece prior” to the April coup.
As events would prove, the Administration’s embrace of the junta’s 
planned “return to democracy” was more ploy than policy, answering, first 
and foremost, to the politically charged public relations problems the coup 
had created for the United States. Only a few days after the coup, Daniel 
Brewster, head of the State Department’s Greek Desk, made the salient 
point: the “important thing” was “to create the impression of progress” [my 
italics] of a return to constitutional rule.15 Over the next several years, US 
policy, in the words of a professor at the State Department’s Foreign Service 
Institute, was a matter of “dancing with dictators”.16 Graciously initiating 
the waltz, Johnson’s letter praised the recent measures “taken to restore a 
more normal condition to Greek political and social life” as “constructive”. 
Ending on a note of high principle, Johnson wished Papadopoulos success in 
his “endeavors to realize in Greece the values to which our peoples aspire”.17 
14 James E. Miller (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol. XVI, 
Washington, DC, 2000, document 352, January 6, 1968.
15 Dan Brewster, State Department memorandum, secret, April 27, 1967, NARA. As 
Richard Nixon’s National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, would candidly explain 
to Johnson’s successor, “The rationale of the past Administration in trying to keep some 
pressure on the military government was to respond in some way to Congressional critics 
of the [military aid] program while at the same time trying to maintain our NATO relations 
with Greece.”; James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage and Laurie Van Hook (eds), Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXIX, Washington, DC, 2008, document 249, 
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs [Kissinger] to 
President Nixon, 14 June 1969. 
16 James E. Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and 
Power, 1950-1974, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009, pp. 157 ff.
17 Department of State telegram, Deptel 108701, February 3, 1968, NARA. 
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The Johnson–Papadopoulos exchange was kept secret, both in Washington 
and Athens. Meanwhile, Ambassador Talbot welcomed Prime Minister 
Papadopoulos aboard the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt aircraft carrier for lunch 
and an “underwater operations demonstration”. Treated to photographs of 
the event in the Athens’ government-supervised press, the Greek public got 
the message. 
First Moves 
In exile, Andreas Papandreou thus faced a dictatorship firmly ensconced in 
power with the discreet public backing of the United States. Complicating the 
task of fighting the dictatorship, his pre-junta clashes with US officials had earned 
him the status of a pariah in American foreign policy circles. Initially regarded 
as an American ally within his father’s newly elected Center Union government, 
Andreas had taken unwelcome stands on a variety of sensitive issues: he had 
challenged aggressive American attempts to achieve a NATO-friendly division 
of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey over the opposition of Cypriot President 
Makarios. He persisted in his demands that the monarchy, regarded by US 
policy-makers as a key “agent of influence” in Greece, stop intervening in the 
politics of Greece’s parliamentary democracy. Finally, he refused to treat EDA, 
the front party for the outlawed Communist Party defeated in the 1946-1949 
Civil War, as an internal “enemy of the nation”, raising suspicions that he was 
willing to engage in a formal alliance with the left. 
In all these ways, Papandreou, increasingly popular with the Greek public 
for his maverick politics, had transgressed the boundaries of permissible, 
Cold-War-sanctified political behavior. Papandreou was pressing for a 
Greece freer, in the context of an emerging superpower détente in Europe, 
to assert Greek national interests in NATO counsels, while domestically 
building a reform movement that challenged the right-wing hegemony of 
the country’s political, economic and military élites. By the time of the coup, 
he had become a magnet for American fears of losing control over a key 
Eastern Mediterranean asset in its rivalry with the Soviet Union. Thanks in 
part to unflattering articles by the influential New York Times columnist C. 
L. Sulzberger (a close confidante and advocate of the king), Andreas’ “public 
image” in the minds of many Americans was that of a demagogic, anti-
American opportunist. 
A visit to the United States was already at the top of Papandreou’s agenda on 
his arrival in Paris. While his release had helped consolidate the dictatorship, it 
had also stoked public interest abroad in hearing what the controversial Greek 
politician had to say. Three days after settling in Paris, he taped an interview, 
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broadcast in the United States on January 21, for the popular American 
public affairs TV program Face the Nation. The program gave Papandreou the 
opportunity to address a critical audience: the politically engaged US public 
and, more particularly, its opinion-makers in government and the news media. 
Papandreou’s appearance on Face the Nation was the opening foray in 
his exile politics, inaugurating a stance towards the US that was at once non-
confrontational and unapologetic. Asked as a “liberal democrat” about the 
American “posture” towards the dictatorship, Andreas based his answer on 
Washington’s continued silence over the regime’s de jure recognition, given 
that the country’s head of state, after his failed counter-coup, was now in exile. 
With Washington delaying its decision on the issue,18 Papandreou noted that 
the “official stand of the United States at this moment is one of non-recognition 
of this regime”. Declaring that “as long as this position is maintained I think 
the image of the United States in Greece will do well,” he added that, “Of 
course, one expects a little more than [non-recognition]. One expects that the 
United States will consider seriously the matter of aid, military aid especially, 
since the weapons that were turned over to the Greek junta are used not to 
protect the integrity of the nation but to enslave the Greeks.”19 
Predictably, interviewer Martin Agronsky challenged Papandreou’s 
appeal for American action by raising his past history as a critic of American 
intervention in Greece’s domestic affairs. “You yourself, when you were in the 
government of your father…were pretty anti-American,” Agronsky asserted. 
“You repeatedly denounced the United States’ involvement in Greece. Do 
18 On December 15, 1967, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared that the US would 
“wait a while” before making a decision on the question of the regime’s de jure recognition 
under international law, given that the country’s head of state was now in exile. On 
January 23, the State Department finally came up with a formula for dealing with the issue, 
announcing through its spokesman that, “the US Government continues to regard King 
Constantine as the Greek chief-of-state – relations between the King and the Government 
in Athens are an internal Greek matter, about which it is not for the US Government to 
comment.” Then, in March the junta issued an edict making General Georgios Zoitakis 
regent, thereby formally maintaining the institution of the monarchy. “Selected US Policy 
Statements on Greece”, Record group 59, NARA.
19 Transcript of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) speech in the James Pyrros 
archive, “The Pyrros Papers: A Collection on the Anti-junta Struggle”, University of 
Michigan Hatcher Graduate Library, Special Collections, Ann Arbor, MI. According to 
Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece, p. 152: “The arms embargo, 
which the administration imposed in haste in the days after the coup, was poorly designed. 
Arms needed for Allied defense against the Warsaw Pact were cut off, while the small arms 
need to repress the Greek population continued to flow to the junta.” 
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you feel now that there should be an American involvement?” Papandreou 
responded curtly to Agronksy’s reference to his alleged anti-Americanism. 
“Anybody who exercises critique, who speaks the truth, who advises correctly is 
not necessarily an enemy,” he declared. “And I have had indeed many arguments 
with the American Embassy in Greece and I have taken many stands concerning 
American policy in Greece where I believe mistakes were made. I believe this has 
weakened American influence in Greece and I believe it has lost many friends.” 
Expanding on his argument, Papandreou attributed his disagreements to an 
ill-advised American stance towards Greece’s political scene in recent times. 
There “has been a tendency,” he asserted, “for the United States’ official policy to 
associate itself exclusively with the right, to consider the center, the democratic 
forces, as somewhat dangerous, let us say a bit pink; and in this fashion, it has 
encouraged reactionary developments in Greece instead of fostering progressive 
and democratic developments.” Repeating his appeal for cutting off military aid, 
he made a bid to discuss the matter more fully with concerned parties in private: 
“As long as the arms are used to subjugate the free people, to enslave the Greeks, 
obviously they should be withheld. This, I think, is very clear. And the other 
questions, one can discuss them privately but I believe not before the public.” 
Papandreou thus assumed the posture not of a hostile opponent, but of 
a candid critic of American policies. Looked at in retrospect, the Face the 
Nation interview also provides a useful marker. It serves as a baseline for 
exploring the startling, and for many junta opponents counter-productive 
radicalization that Papandreou’s exile politics would undergo over the next 
six and a half years. By the time of the junta’s abrupt collapse in July 1974, 
Papandreou had mutated from an unrepentant, but restrained critic of US 
policies into the militant leader of a nascent national liberation movement, 
with PAK advocating armed struggle to free Greece from the “bonds of 
American imperialism”. The story of this transformation reveals much about 
the political persona of the leader who would dominate Greek politics in the 
last decades of the twentieth century. 
The American Tour
From Athens, Ambassador Talbot tried to prepare the ground for 
Papandreou’s Washington reception. A week before that trip, Talbot alerted 
the State Department that the Embassy Country Team (which included the 
CIA station chief and the Pentagon’s defense attaché) was concerned lest the 
visit “harm” US efforts both to nudge the dictators towards democracy and 
“to protect important strategic factors at stake”.20 To be sure, Talbot noted, 
20 Embassy telegram to Secretary of State, Personal for Assistant Secretary Battle, 
February 27, 1968, Record Group 59, NARA.
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Papandreou had scored only modest successes so far in Europe. In West 
Germany, popular Social Democrat Willy Brandt had met him in his role 
of party leader, rather than as foreign minister. In the UK, Papandreou had 
failed to “achieve any high-level meetings” with government officials. Talbot 
urged that Papandreou be given the same treatment in the United States by 
limiting Papandreou’s “official contacts” to the mid-level State Department 
bureaucrats. Adding weight to that recommendation was opinion among 
erstwhile Greek political élites. The junta’s “nationalist opponents (people 
such as [Evangelos] Averoff and other ERE leaders, as well as a good many 
Center Union personalities…) would be antagonized,” Talbot contended, if 
Papandreou were given “important official attention in Washington”. They 
are “anxious…lest opposition to the regime be divided and undermined by 
what they regard as Andreas’ psychotic, paranoid approach”.21
Still, Talbot feared that limiting Papandreou’s official contacts would not be 
enough to neutralize the political “harm” he might inflict on US policy efforts. 
While in the United States, Papandreou could be expected to take “advantage 
of various public, Capitol Hill and academic platforms offered him…to 
attack…the [US government] and this embassy”. As a counter-measure, Talbot 
recommended that the Department consider doing “deep backgrounding of 
certain congressmen and possibly [media] correspondents” using “select items” 
from CIA and Department files to demonstrate Papandreou’s “substantial 
record of political unreliability and opportunism”. Counseling “extreme 
circumspection” in using such sensitive material, he advised, nonetheless, that 
such a stratagem “should afford a salutatory corrective to the oversimplified 
image [Papandreou] enjoys in certain American circles as a disinterested 
champion of democratic progress”. 
In further preparation for Papandreou’s Washington visit, Ambassador 
Talbot had a three-hour meeting with the Greek dictator on March 6. He 
alerted Papadopoulos that “The ’noise level’ in [the] American press and on 
21 In reporting that Papandreou’s “approach” was seen as “psychotic” and “paranoid”, 
Talbot was likely quoting Andreas’ most acerbic Greek critics to validate his own longstanding 
hostile stance – a stance that, pre-junta, included proposing CIA “limited covert action” 
to undercut Papandreou’s rapidly expanding popular base in the parliamentary elections 
that the 1967 coup had prevented from happening. However, his broader point was not 
without a basis in reality. With the exception of erstwhile deputies belonging to the center-
left caucus he had formed within the Center Union, Andreas was largely regarded with 
antipathy by the country’s now-displaced political class. Animosity towards him among 
politicians of the center and the right, as well as his difficult relations with the communist 
left would play a decisive role in shaping Papandreou’s exile politics; cf. Stan Draenos, 
Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick, London: I. 
B. Tauris, 2012, pp. 252 ff.
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TV could rise pretty high, but explained that certain groups offering Andreas 
platforms also happened to be those who were most vocal in their criticisms of 
the Administration’s Vietnam policy.” Thus, while “advocacy” by such groups 
“could temporarily limit” American “maneuverability” on Greek affairs, it 
was “unlikely to result in any basic changes in policy toward Greece”. For 
his part, Papadopoulos appeared to Talbot to be “relaxed” about the visit’s 
“public relations aspects”. Yet, the junta leader did specify that the one thing 
“sure to cause real concern [was] if Andreas were to receive public high-level 
official attention” in the US. According to his report to Washington, Talbot 
assured Papadopoulos that he would not.22 
Two days later, Papandreou arrived in Washington for his month-long 
tour of North America that would climax in Toronto (a major destination 
for the most recent wave of Greek economic emigrants), where he delivered 
a rousing anti-junta speech to thousands of pro-democracy Greeks. His 
first week, however, was spent at the command-center of the American 
superpower, Washington, DC. There, he pursued his immediate political 
priority: to push for a “reconsideration” of US policy towards the junta, with 
the termination of US military aid a first priority, in hopes of achieving a 
relatively painless “political solution” to the Greek problem. Papandreou 
was not alone, of course, in that quest. The search for a political solution 
preoccupied much of Greece’s now-displaced political class, both within 
and outside the country. Focusing their hopes on Constantinos Karamanlis, 
politicians across the spectrum persistently lobbied Karamanlis to lead such 
an effort, possibly in tandem with the exiled king. Papandreou also played on 
this field. However, on this issue, as on most others, he would find himself 
the odd man out.
A major speaking engagement was the first item on Papandreou’s 
Washington agenda. The day after his arrival, he was scheduled to deliver 
the keynote address at the 20th Annual Roosevelt Day Dinner held by the 
greater Washington chapter of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). 
A prestigious 50,000-member liberal Democratic Party political action group, 
the ADA included colleagues from the university world, friends from his 
days as a Democratic Party activist in the 1950s, and political allies from the 
Kennedy-era launch of his Greek political career. The ADA’s new national 
president was John Kenneth Galbraith, with whom he had recently spent an 
all-night gab session in Paris.23 
22 Telegram from Talbot to Secretary of State (secret), March 7, 1968, LBJ Library.
23 Author interview with Galbraith at his home in Cambridge, MA, October 18, 2002.
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To all appearances, the ADA speaking engagement represented an ideal 
forum for mobilizing support among prominent Democratic Party activists, 
restive over Vietnam, for a “reconsideration” of American policy towards the 
junta. Nevertheless, Papandreou approached that opportunity with caution. 
Before traveling to the US, “I was careful not to attack the US government for 
its involvement in the coup,” he would write in Democracy at Gunpoint, the 
mid-term memoirs which he started writing a few months later. “I felt that 
there were possibilities both within the Administration and within the political 
world of the United States for a reappraisal of the situation.”24 In fact, however, 
he was not just cautious, but apprehensive about his ADA appearance. Margaret 
Papandreou recalled that he “would have preferred not to give a speech at all”.25
Andreas and Margaret were greeted at Washington’s Dulles Airport by a 
small welcoming party, including close confidantes Angelos and Julia Clones, 
and congressional aide Jim Pyrros, who described himself as “favorable to 
Andreas, but not completely sold on him”.26 Informed that Ambassador Talbot 
was seeking advance copies of his ADA speech, Papandreou remarked that he 
“must be careful to review the speech and see that every paragraph can stand 
on its own. Otherwise, they’ll take it out of context.” Handing them the draft 
for his talk, he and Margaret retired to their suite in the sedate Hay-Adams 
Hotel near the White House. 
Poring through the draft’s 17 single-spaced pages, Pyrros “read it with 
astonishment at its inadequacies”. Mainly a “dull recitation” of economic and 
political theory “over the past four decades”, the “first 11 pages did not mention 
Greece once”. Pyrros’ negative opinion was shared by his wife, Betty, as well as 
by Angelos and Julia Clones (“boring, boring!” Julia exclaimed). “Andreas is a 
hot item here,” Pyrros noted, “People want to know why dictatorship came to 
Greece, why he was jailed, why he is out, what’s going to happen. They don’t want 
to hear a lecture on socio-economic theory.” An outsider to the Papandreou 
circle, Pyrros turned the situation over to Angelos Clones, “He’ll have to scrap 
it,” Clones remarked. After giving him a few hours to rest, Clones visited 
Papandreou in his room. Late that night, Pyrros received a call from Julia, who 
reported that “It was a fight.” “Apparently,” Pyrros wrote in his diary, “Angelo 
went in hammering, Andreas resisted and made some concessions at last.”27 
24 Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 
1970. The preface is dated August 16, 1969.
25 Email to author, October 14, 2014.
26 Pyrros journal, entry for March 8, 1968. Many thanks to James Pyrros for making 
entries to his journal available. 
27 Pyrros journal, entry for March 8, 1968. The heated discussion between Clones and 
Papandreou was interrupted by the arrival of Steven Rousseas and Stanley Sheinbaum, 
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Fig. 2. March 8, 1968 diary entry of US congressional aide James Pyrros, 
a liberal Democrat supportive of the democratic cause in Greece, 
on the arrival of Andreas and Margaret Papandreou in Washington, DC. 
Courtesy of James Pyrros.
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Papandreou’s attempt to avoid controversy by escaping into academic 
abstraction suggests that more was at stake for him than just the danger 
of spoiling the atmosphere for talks with the Johnson Administration. 
In any case, it seems unlikely that he expected to make headway on that 
front. Washington concurred with Talbot’s (and implicitly Papadopoulos’) 
recommendation that Papandreou be denied “important official attention”, 
turning down his request to see the secretaries of state and defense – a refusal 
Papandreou (given the British cold shoulder) must have at least suspected 
before leaving Paris. Relegating him to meetings with assistant secretaries, 
the Johnson Administration signaled that it had little interest in hearing his 
arguments for an American policy shift.28 
A confluence of factors explains Papandreou’s own desire to keep a low 
profile. In marshalling his inner resources for the fight, Papandreou had acted 
so far on political instinct. The creation of PAK reflected his sense that he 
needed to organize for the fight. Nonetheless, PAK was effectively still on the 
drawing board – an abstract concept yet to be materialized organizationally. 
Moreover, his eight months in prison had deprived him of any substantial 
contact with developments in the outside world. Asked to speak barely 
two months after his release, he had yet to sort out all the factors affecting 
the “Greek problem” and develop a larger strategy, one that answered the 
key questions of what the fight was about and how it should be conducted. 
Problems of a personal nature also complicated that task. The abrupt 
transition from prison to Paris confronted him with a crush of unanswered 
questions about where to live and how to support his seven-member family 
– issues by no means irrelevant to his ability to carry on the fight from exile. 
Likely the most decisive factor feeding Papandreou’s uncertainties was 
the ongoing upheaval in American politics. As he arrived in Washington, 
the Johnson government found itself beleaguered by an escalating crisis 
over the American war in Vietnam. With troop commitments approaching 
half a million, the bloody conflict had sparked a vociferous, anti-war protest 
movement centered in the country’s colleges and universities. Converging 
with the black civil rights struggle, the movement had given birth to a New 
Left politics, introducing unorthodox perspectives into the country’s Cold-
War dominated foreign policy discourse, a development Papandreou had 
as well as Melina Mercouri and her husband, Jules Dassin, in from New York following 
a successful run of Illya Darling, a Broadway version of the film that had given Melina 
international renown, Never on Sunday. Nevertheless, Clones succeeded in persuading 
Papandreou to make major changes to his speech. 
28 Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, p. 338. 
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watched with sympathetic interest in the months leading up to the April coup. 
For the Johnson Administration, matters had taken a turn for the worse when, 
in late January 1968, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces launched wide-
ranging, coordinated attacks against US positions in what came to be known 
as the Tet Offensive. Still in progress as Papandreou landed in Washington, 
the offensive dealt the Johnson Administration a humiliating blow. With 
the credibility of government claims of imminent victory shattered, public 
support for the war collapsed. 
Meanwhile, within the governing Democratic Party itself, the ADA had 
become a flashpoint in anti-war dissent. The organization had been founded 
in 1947 in support of President Truman’s landmark decision for American 
intervention in the Greek Civil War. It historical identification with the 
cause of Greek democracy was thus linked to the launch of America’s Cold-
War crusade against alleged Soviet expansionism; but, two decades later, 
the Vietnam quagmire had shaken faith in the conduct and objectives of 
America’s Cold-War project, producing splits among ADA liberals. Already, 
John Kenneth Galbraith had incurred Johnson’s wrath by become a vocal 
critic of his war policies.29 Then, a month before Papandreou’s arrival in 
Washington, the ADA’s national board, in a vote that split the organization, 
endorsed the bid of peace candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy to challenge 
President Johnson for the Democratic Party nomination ahead of November’s 
presidential elections. McCarthy announced his candidacy at Galbraith’s 
Cambridge home. Meanwhile, US Vice President Hubert Humphrey, an ADA 
co-founder (and erstwhile Papandreou political friend) dutifully shouldered 
the burden of serving as the president’s loyal defender. 
The Greek junta, of course, was not at the center of the political upheaval 
over Vietnam; neither was it irrelevant. The Papadopoulos coup, after all, 
had not taken place in a far-off Asian country like Vietnam, whose politics 
were at best obscure. A NATO country whose parliamentary democracy 
(however defective) had been rescued thanks to American military and 
economic aid, Greece was regarded to be a success story that validated the 
principle of American interventionism in the name of democracy. Yet, 
while much of the American public and many Congressional liberals were 
inherently sympathetic to the democratic cause in Greece, that sympathy 
was, in many cases, wed organically to anti-communism. Indicatively, Jim 
29 For Galbraith’s first anti-war article, cf. The Harvard Crimson, June 7, 1967 (accessible 
online: http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1967/7/7/galbraiths-vietnam-war-speech-calls-
for/).
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Pyrros, commenting on Papandreou’s original draft, complained that it 
made “no reference whatever” to the ADA’s “Truman Doctrine heritage, their 
great cause versus the Far Left. I don’t like that. It’s a sign that [Papandreou] 
erroneously seeks to cater to the far left in Greece.” 
Held at the Sheraton Park Hotel, the ADA dinner was a gala event, 
complete with live bouzouki music and a moussaka main course. The more 
than 700 guests present included a substantial cohort of US-based Greeks and 
Greek-Americans, including the controversial investigative journalist Elias 
Demetracopoulos; a young international relations professor, Ted Couloumbis; 
and Andreas’ former teacher from Athens College, Harilaos Lagoudakis, a 
long-time Greek analyst at the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and 
Research. The majority of guests, however, were American liberals prominent 
in the worlds of politics, journalism, labor, and business. The crowd cheered 
heartily as Andreas and Margaret entered the ballroom hand in hand and took 
their seats at the head table. Melina Mercouri, who with other notables shared 
the dais, embraced Andreas as he prepared to deliver his address. 
Papandreou’s hastily revised speech represented his first attempt, since 
release from prison, to develop a coherent narrative around the “Greek 
problem”, affording valuable insight into the logic, as well as the tensions, 
informing the initial phase of his exile politics.30 Those tensions quickly 
became apparent. His speech made the case for an American policy shift on 
Greece that resonated broadly with the sponsoring organization’s democratic 
credo. However, it articulated that case in the context of perspectives on US 
foreign policy that identified Papandreou with the views of the emergent 
New Left in the United States and Europe, reconnecting him with insights he 
already had arrived at in the months leading to April coup. 
Papandreou began with the good news, telling his listeners that, “Your 
government did indeed intervene to protect the lives of political prisoners 
– for which we are grateful.” He soon delved into a sobering analysis of how 
the political processes as they operate in “modern societies” (and particularly 
the United States) put foreign policy decisions “beyond the reach of the average 
citizen”, with “decisive influence” residing instead “with the professionals of 
the State Department, with the Pentagon and with the CIA”. Growing by “leaps 
and bounds”, a “military-intelligence complex” [his emphases] was dominating 
American foreign policy formation. In the name of protecting “basic freedoms of 
the individual and democratic institutions in the West”, its exclusive concern was 
30 All quotes from the speech as published in ADA World Magazine 3/5 (May 1968).
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fighting the Cold War. An outgrowth of that concern was NATO, which had been 
assigned “the mission to protect the world from the spread of totalitarianism”.
Yet, in the postwar period, Papandreou argued, a “gap” between America’s 
democratic ideals and its actions on the ground “has been widening in a 
frightening way”, with the US somehow finding it “advisable to associate 
itself, to ally itself with totally totalitarian regimes – such as the present 
junta regime in Greece – in order to further the cause of ’freedom’ and 
’human dignity’ in the world”. He cited the “shock” of the recent official US 
recognition of the Greek regime, as well as of recent shows of “warmth and 
friendship” by the US and NATO, asking “What are the Greeks supposed to 
say to all this? How are they supposed to react?” Greece had joined NATO “in 
order to safeguard its freedom. And now we are faced with the bitter fact that 
the very organization we joined in order to protect this freedom is arming to 
the teeth the military mafia which usurped the government of our country 
and subjugated our people.” 
Calling the junta a “provincial and primitive lot”, Papandreou debunked 
its disingenuous claim of saving Greece from a “communist takeover”. He 
asserted that the real “threat” the 1967 coup had saved Greece from was a 
“smashing victory of the Center Union party”, whose platform, he declared, 
sought to address “the economically, socially and politically backward state 
of the nation”. Donning his hat as spokesman for the Center Union abroad 
(a role assigned him by his father before leaving Athens), he cited the forces 
ranged against the Center Union’s “great quest for the democratization of 
public life”: the “hysterical attitude toward the left” that had “to all intents 
and purposes emasculated the basic freedoms formally guaranteed by the 
Greek constitution”; the involvement of the army in the country’s politics; 
the king, who had “become accustomed” to participating in the governing 
of the land; NATO, whose “dominant members” typically treated Greece 
“as a satellite rather than an ally”; and the United States, which persisted in 
playing “an active role in determining the outcome of the political process in 
Greece”. Finally, while not charging the US with direct, material involvement 
in the April coup, Papandreou criticized the US Embassy for giving “strong 
moral support to the king and the Greek establishment…thus paving the way 
for the military coup”. 
Such statements made clear that Papandreou, while still uncertain of his 
exile strategy, had no intention of retreating on the core positions he had 
advocated in the aftermath of the July 1965 events, positions that had put him 
at odds with the monarchy, the anti-communist military officer corps, the 
US Embassy and even moderate Center Union members, such as Georgios 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 02:13:03 |
 Andreas Papandreou’s Exile Politics 49
Mavros. To do so would have meant abandoning the identity that had 
earned him a substantial public following: that of a democratic reformer, the 
spokesman for a new, socially progressive nationalism that transcended the 
complexes and prohibitions of the Cold War. 
Notably, Papandreou’s depiction of the Center Union as the political 
party representing this new narrative was a kind of Platonic “noble fiction” 
– a projection of the Center Union as the vehicle for the “great quest for 
the democratization of public life” that, in fact, defined his own reformist 
program for Greek politics. In fact, in the period leading up to the April 
coup, he had managed to mobilize both an ardent public following and a 
substantial cohort within the Center Union parliamentary group around this 
vision, thereby presaging PASOK, the “movement” he would found in 1974 
and that in 1981 would bring him to power in sweeping electoral victory.
Yet here, Papandreou’s description of the political stakes in pre-
dictatorship Greece confronted what he told his audience was the “truly 
amazing” feature of the junta phenomenon. For the junta was not an 
unambiguous manifestation of the conflict between the forces of “the people” 
and the forces of “the establishment” that had been the axis of Papandreou’s 
pre-coup politics. The April putschists, he correctly observed, “did not have 
the support of any political party, any class interest, or any region of the 
nation. They did not even have the support of the army, which they managed 
to surprise and subjugate by relying on the Greek intelligence services.” 
Moreover, since coming to power, the regime had not succeeded “in obtaining 
the support of any section of the Greek population. Right, center and left are 
passionately against it.”31 
Here, Papandreou touched on a feature of the junta phenomenon that 
was critical to the dynamics of the internal politics among Greece’s banished 
political class. The junta’s isolation from the country’s erstwhile popularly 
elected representatives meant that, de facto, Papandreou found himself on 
the same side of the barricades as the rest of the country’s political world. As 
he well knew, most of the leadership figures within that world were either 
31 Although this assertion finesses rather than addresses the effective absence of active 
resistance against the junta, two events support Papandreou’s depiction of the dictatorship’s 
standing with the political world and the public at large. First, the massive crowds that came 
out for his father’s funeral eight months later would vividly exemplify the fact that, politically 
speaking, passive acquiescence for a regime is not the same as active support. Secondly, nearly 
every political figure, irrespective of political ideology, opposed the junta’s 1968 constitution, 
despite the prospect it offered of enabling them once again to participate, in some fashion, 
in the country’s politics. 
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rivals (like Mavros or Konstantinos Mitsotakis) or outright opponents (like 
Panayotis Kanellopoulos or Averoff).32 Yet, listeners at the ADA event were 
not the appropriate audience for addressing internal differences among 
Greek politicians. Instead, Papandreou drew a conclusion from the fact of 
the junta’s domestic isolation that was of immediate pragmatic relevance to 
Americans: “The only thing that keeps [the junta] in power is the support it is 
getting from the US and some of the NATO allies.” The message was clear. “If 
the junta were isolated morally, militarily and economically,” he declared, “it 
would collapse of its own weight.” 
What were the chances, in the first place, that the US and “some NATO 
allies” might reverse course and turn against the junta? Papandreou remained 
silent on that issue, refraining from even posing the question. Still, the 
attentive listener would have had little difficulty in guessing what that answer 
would have been. In his opening remarks, Papandreou had argued that Cold-
War conditions had fostered the rise of a “military-intelligence complex”, 
whose foreign policy decisions were beyond the reach of the average citizen 
and the country’s traditional democratic processes. Given that the junta 
was itself an “outgrowth” of this same power center, the odds were long on 
achieving a policy shift through the American political process. 
Papandreou did not draw that pessimistic assessment for his audience. 
He turned instead to the current direction of US policy, explaining how that 
policy looked from the Greek side of the street. Since “a number of Western 
governments have chosen to follow the example of the US government in 
recognizing and supporting this brutal dictatorship,” he averred, “the Greek 
people have no alternative but to organize their own resistance against the 
junta.” Thus, speaking as the people’s tribune, Papandreou reaffirmed the right 
to resistance, introducing PAK, which, in minimalist language, he described as 
the coordinator of a “resistance effort” to “liberate our land from this internal 
occupation force”, a task to which all the Greeks, “independently of party 
association, will offer their time, their effort and possibly their lives”. 
Papandreou then questioned the wisdom of current American policies on 
pragmatic grounds: “Is it in the long-term interests of the US government to 
be identified with the junta in Greece?” More pointedly, he asked, “For what 
reasons would [the US government] prefer to be identified with the brutal 
32 Even King Constantine, the presumptive leader of the Greek establishment, had rebelled 
against the regime and now found himself in exile. Although the figures of the political right 
and moderate center generally escaped the regime’s brutality (torture of political figures 
being reserved largely for those on the left and Andreas’ followers), they too had been denied 
rudimentary political freedoms under threat of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.
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forces of oppression rather than with the democratic forces in Greece?” There 
was “still time for a reconsideration of policy by your government toward 
Greece,” he argued, while warning that, if it were not forthcoming, “there is 
the likelihood [that] the Greek volcano will erupt.” 
By Pyrros’ count, Papandreou was interrupted by applause 14 times, 
showing that Greece’s democratic cause had a purchase on the political 
consciences of American liberals. Yet public sympathy was one thing; 
effective action another. That would require a shift in Washington power 
relationships. Even though the current Administration had effectively closed 
its doors on making a policy shift, the heated election-year foreign policy 
debate did appear to offer some potential openings, ones that Papandreou 
was uniquely positioned to exploit. 
Eclipse of the American Option
Opposition to the Vietnam War had been building within the Democratic 
Party for months, focused on peace-candidate Eugene McCarthy, a thoughtful, 
relatively unknown Democratic senator. Three days after Papandreou’s ADA 
appearance, McCarthy gave the incumbent Johnson a run for his money in 
the New Hampshire primary race. McCarthy’s impressive showing signaled a 
virtual revolt within the Party’s voting base, triggering Robert Kennedy, a more 
compelling and popular figure than the low-key McCarthy, to enter the fray. 
The development was sheer serendipity for Papandreou, who enjoyed 
close ties in Kennedy circles, most prominently with Robert Kennedy’s key 
adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.33 On March 16, the day Kennedy made his 
decision public, Papandreou met him at his office for an hour and then rode 
with him to the press conference, where, promising to “end the bloodshed” 
both in Vietnam and the country’s racially troubled cities, Kennedy would 
announce his candidacy.34 According to Papandreou’s account, he briefed 
33 For Papandreou’s connection with the covert Schlesinger network within the 
Kennedy Administration, cf. Draenos, Andreas Papandreou, pp. 59 ff. Papandreou had 
other ties to the Kennedy Administration. Ted Kennedy had visited Papandreou’s Center 
of Economic Research in the early 1960s. Also, while Papandreou was in prison, Jacqueline 
Kennedy and her friend Irene Papas each donated $500 to a committee to free Andreas 
from prison set up in New York by a close aide to Papandreou at the time, according to 
Stephen Rousseas’ listing of contributions from “The Andreas Papandreou Committee for 
Freedom in Greece”, March 15, 1968, Rousseas archives, Columbia University Rare Book 
and Manuscript Library, New York.
34 Three weeks after the April coup, Kennedy had said in a TV debate with Ronald 
Reagan that, “I think the United States must make it clear that we – that our relationship 
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Kennedy on the “Greek Question”, arguing that cutting off military aid was 
“the one single US action that would bring the colonels to their knees”.35 
Kennedy “agreed with me immediately,” according to Papandreou, declaring 
his readiness to declare publicly his intention, should he become president, 
for an immediate cessation of aid. “You think this will do it?” Kennedy asked. 
“It would be sufficient,” Papandreou replied. “We will do the rest.” 
Papandreou professed feeling “quite elated” after the meeting. In reality, 
a number of hurdles would need to be cleared before Kennedy would be in a 
position to carry through on his pledge. He would first have to win his bid for 
the Democratic Party nomination, then beat his rival Republican candidate 
in the general elections, and finally, as president, overcome stiff resistance 
from within the Executive Branch itself to halting military aid. 
Leaving Washington, Papandreou continued his whirlwind tour of North 
America. A stay in New York was highlighted by a fundraising dinner at the 
Biltmore Hotel, where Schlesinger, Melina Mercouri, and actress Irene Papas 
joined Papandreou at the head table. He then traveled with Margaret to 
Minneapolis, Chicago, and various cities in California to see political supporters, 
old university colleagues and relatives (their eldest son, George, had been sent 
to Margaret’s parents, who lived near Chicago, to attend school). In California, 
they spent time with Stanley and Betty Sheinbaum before moving on to Toronto 
for a mass rally on April 7, where some 7000 Greek immigrants responded 
exuberantly to his speech at the University of Toronto’s Varsity Arena. The 
Toronto event confirmed Papandreou’s continuing popularity with a core 
following. Toronto’s 60,000-strong Greek community included large numbers 
of youth from the most recent exodus of working people who had left Greece 
to seek employment abroad. By condition and outlook, this younger generation 
of Greeks was a natural audience for the modernizing agenda that had fueled 
Papandreou’s rise during his brief pre-coup tenure in Greek politics. Under the 
new conditions imposed by the dictatorship, they exemplified a potential asset 
that Papandreou would tap by creating local Friends of PAK organizations in 
centers of the Greek diaspora, particularly in Canada and West Germany. 
Wrapping up his North American tour, Papandreou returned to New 
York amidst a cascade of events in American politics. On March 31, President 
with Greece is going to continue to be strained unless the country returns to democratic 
processes, and I, for one, would be opposed to giving any military aid or assistance to Greece 
until it’s made quite clear that the people themselves are going to determine their future, 
not a military junta.” CBS Town Hall meeting, May 15, 1967 (accessible online: http://
reagan2020.us/speeches/reagan_kennedy_debate.asp).
35 Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, p. 338.
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Johnson had stunned the nation by announcing his decision not to seek the 
Democratic Party’s nomination for president, thus boosting Robert Kennedy’s 
prospects, while leaving Vice President Humphrey – politically compromised 
by his identification with the president’s war policies – as the candidate of the 
Party establishment. Then, on April 4, civil rights leader Martin Luther King was 
assassinated in New Orleans, unleashing a wave of riots in black ghettos across 
the country. A week later, Papandreou gave a talk on the Greek dictatorship 
at Columbia University, just as militant New Left anti-war protests, eventually 
suppressed violently by the police, were beginning to get underway. Political 
turmoil followed Papandreou to Paris, where he was witness to the watershed 
May Events that reshaped French political culture, even as the majority of the 
voting public turned more conservative.36 
Then disaster struck. On June 5, Robert Kennedy was cut down by an assassin’s 
bullet after delivering a speech celebrating his victory in California’s critical 
Democratic primary. The assassination was a devastating blow to (possibly 
illusory) hopes, not just among anti-junta Greeks, but among progressives 
throughout the West that a second Kennedy Presidency could bring about a 
fundamental change in America’s conception of its global role, beginning with a 
negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam. 
The NATO Front
News of Kennedy’s assassination arrived in Paris as the Papandreous were 
packing for a move to Sweden, where Andreas had accepted a one-year 
teaching position at the University of Stockholm. Papandreou had harbored 
doubts that a change at the White House would be enough to reverse 
America’s stance towards the junta. Kennedy’s assassination turned those 
doubts into certainties.37 Hope was however still alive on another front. As 
the CIA observed in its secret April 1968 National Intelligence Estimate, “The 
coup has severely complicated Greece’s relationship with most of its NATO 
36 In a comic aside, the Papandreous’ 12-year-old son, Nikos, somehow decided to go 
to a masquerade party he had been invited to dressed as a hippie. Taking to the street with 
a beard pasted to his chin to go the party, he was promptly arrested by the police. Once the 
police realized his age, two gendarmes accompanied him to his home, to ensure his safety.
37 Criticism of American backing for the junta would remain on the agenda of liberals in 
Congress, serving as a rallying point for efforts to bring the presidency’s autocratic exercise 
of foreign affairs – and wars – under congressional control, and also helping to keep the 
“Greek Question” alive through congressional debates and public hearings. Over the 
following few years, however, attempts to rein in America’s “imperial presidency” would 
meet with only limited success.
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allies.”38 Papandreou’s exile diplomacy thus shifted its focus to turning the 
Greek dictatorship’s problems within NATO into a problem for the United 
States. Papandreou would repeatedly visit Denmark and Norway to lobby 
them, against American wishes, to act within NATO against the junta. With 
the junta facing a wall of domestic opposition from the leadership of Greece’s 
outlawed political parties, the focus was on isolating the junta internationally 
as well by cutting off military aid from Greece’s Western allies. Paced by the 
schedule of ministerial-level gatherings, the strategy required patience and 
persistence. For the next two years, Papandreou’s exile diplomacy would be 
devoted to “Operation NATO”, as he musingly called it. 
Mobilizing diplomatic pressures on the USA through NATO was not 
Papandreou’s only priority. Of equal weight and urgency was resistance 
within Greece. Settling into Sweden in June 1968, Andreas and family spent 
the summer at a remote island-farm belonging to a young, rising figure 
in Sweden’s Social Democratic Party, Pierre Schori (later Swedish foreign 
minister and UN representative). Andreas regularly plunged into the island’s 
icy waters for “therapeutic and invigorating” swims, Schori remembered. 
Seclusion gave Andreas and Margaret the opportunity to begin writing their 
books on the tumult of their recent experiences in Greece.39 
At the same time, resistance planning was also on the agenda. In July, 
the Papandreous had visitors. George Lianis, a young Purdue University 
aeronautics engineer, arrived with his wife Dora from the United States.40 
During Lianis’ stay, three resistance groups sent representatives from Greece to 
see Andreas, including one consisting “almost exclusively of decommissioned 
army-air force officers who belonged to the liberal camp,” as Lianis reported 
after returning to Purdue.41 One thing was settled, Lianis wrote. “PAK under 
38 NIE number 29.1-68, “Greece”, submitted by Richard Helms, CIA Director, LBJ Library. 
39 Author interview with Pierre Schori in New York, October 20, 2003.
40 A member of the EAM youth organization, EPON, during the Occupation, Lianis had 
left Greece in 1953, after the right became entrenched in power, to pursue an academic 
career abroad. The rise of the Center Union drew his attention back to Greece. Enthused 
by what he was reading of Andreas’ reformist politics, Lianis wrote him a letter. After 
a long delay, Papandreou responded in August 1964 with a letter inviting Lianis to 
participate in an international conference Andreas was organizing to help the Center 
Union government make plans for a new university in Patras. Taking his 1965-1966 
sabbatical in Greece, Lianis joined the “Fabian” Papanastasiou Society and soon became 
part of the Papandreou circle. A member of Margaret’s covert support network to free 
Andreas from prison, he had become a trusted lieutenant in Papandreou’s efforts to 
organize PAK in the United States.
41 Speedletter from Lianis to Sheinbaum, July 29, 1968, Stanley K. Sheinbaum Collection, 
Davidson Library, University of California at Santa Barbara.
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the leadership of Andreas will include in its program resistance activities.” 
[Lianis’ emphasis] With financial and technical aid from PAK, these resistance 
representatives from Greece agreed to mount “hit-and-run” operations. 
Such acts were not expected to overthrow the junta. Instead, they aimed at 
boosting Greek morale, “which has declined dangerously especially after 
the assassination of Robert Kennedy”, but also at destroying the impression 
abroad that the Greek people had accepted the junta. Not leaving resistance 
planning to mere talk, Papandreou and Lianis also used Schori’s farm to test 
“experimental gadgets” for detonating explosive devices by remote control.42 
A number of considerations fed Andreas’ interest in active resistance, but 
prominent among them was its importance to “Operation NATO”. In order 
for Norway and Denmark actually to confront the United States in NATO 
over the Greek dictatorship, they needed “palpable proof”, as a PAK strategy 
paper would later put it, “that the Greek people are ready to engage in 
active resistance”.43 If the campaign to isolate the junta internationally were 
to succeed, resistance within Greece was also necessary, but the resistance 
planning in Sweden yielded only meager results. “Sporadic resistance has 
begun in Greece,” Margaret informed Sheinbaum in August, while cautioning 
that, “it has a long struggle ahead.”44 Writing to Lianis in early September, 
Andreas wrote cryptically that, “We are submerged in truly interesting work 
of the sort you were occupied with when you were here,” though he added, 
“there have been many arrests in Greece and, of necessity, we must wait.”45
Meanwhile, Papandreou’s relationship with Greece’s communist left got 
off on a positive footing as developments within the KKE mirrored the broader 
mood of reform that was gaining momentum within Europe’s communist 
parties. That new mood was manifested dramatically in Czechoslovakia’s 
Prague Spring, a political and economic liberalization movement initiated 
in April by the new first secretary of the country’s communist party, 
Alexander Dubček. A revival of democratic aspirations in the Soviet camp, 
Dubček’s “socialism with a human face” was akin to the New Left’s quest 
for “participatory democracy” in the West. Moreover, the Prague Spring 
42 Ibid. Independently, Schori told a similar story. 
43 “Strategy Statement of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement”, Stockholm, June 5, 
1970, author archive.
44 Margaret Papandreou letter, August 23, 1968, Sheinbaum Collection. A series of minor 
explosions had recently taken place on August 14 and 19, 1968. Cf. Nikos Klitsikas, Π.Α.Κ. 
Πανελλήνιο Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα [PAK: Panhellenic Liberation Movement], Athens: 
Proskinio, 2001, for an exhaustive list, pp. 256-257.
45 Letter of September 6, 1968, author archive.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 11/01/2020 02:13:03 |
56 Stan Draenos 
Fig. 3. “The Pentagon will change its tactics only when the cost of maintaining its control 
on the political life of Greece becomes higher than the benefits that derive from it.”
From the “Strategy Statement of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement”, 
June 5, 1970, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Source: Author archive.
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paralleled discontent with Moscow-line orthodoxy within several communist 
parties in Western European, including Greece’s KKE. 
Following the February 1968 meeting of the KKE Central Committee in 
Bucharest, long-smoldering tensions erupted into a split between the party’s 
East European-based exile leadership, under Secretary-General Kostas 
Koliyannis, and its Greek-based leaders responsible for the ideological 
guidance of EDA, the legal front for the KKE. The dissenters formed a 
new communist party they dubbed the KKE (Interior Bureau). While 
more independent of direction from Moscow, the new party remained 
sentimentally attached to the Soviet Union as the fatherland of socialism. 
Tracking these developments from exile, Papandreou made contact with 
Antonis Brillakis in Italy. A former EDA deputy, Brillakis was a leading figure 
in the newly formed KKE (Interior) and, in exile, was the representative for 
the Patriotic Anti-Dictatorial Front (PAM), a resistance organization created 
by Mikis Theodorakis. Talks in Italy during July lead to their issuing a joint 
statement on August 1 announcing that PAM and PAK, putting aside their 
ideological differences, would collaborate to coordinate resistance activities, 
both within Greece and abroad.46 Greeted with disdain by Greece’s bourgeois 
politicians, the announcement confirmed the suspicions of Andreas’ anti-
communist critics, who saw him as a “fellow-traveler” whose flirtations with 
the left, if successful, would end up leading Greece into the Soviet camp.47 
His ailing father, a veteran anti-communist, also considered the agreement 
a “major mistake”, effectively continuing their disagreements after the 1965 
July events over collaboration with the left. (Likewise, the reverse question – 
what stance the left should take towards the center – was among the internal 
KKE conflicts that produced the 1968 party split.)
A week later, Papandreou explained his rationale for the move in a 
confidential letter to Lianis. “In Italy,” he wrote from Sweden, “we concluded 
an agreement with the Patriotic Front (PAM).” While PAM had no interest 
in entering PAK, it had “become clear”, he averred, “that continuation of the 
lack of cooperation in the overall resistance effort would have adverse effects”. 
46 “Συμφωνία Πατριωτικού Μετώπου–ΠΑΚ για τον συντονισμό της δράσης των αντι-
στασιακών δυνάμεων” [Agreement between PAM and PAK for the coordination of resistance 
activities], August 1, 1968, Antonis Brillakis archive, Contemporary Social History Archives, 
ASKI, Athens.
47 For the views of ERE’s leader, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, on Andreas’ agreement with 
Brillakis, cf. his letter to Karamanlis of June 16, 1969, in Constantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), 
Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής. Αρχείο, γεγονότα και κείμενα [Constantinos Karamanlis: 
Archive, facts and texts], Vol. VII, Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 1995, p. 109.
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Moreover, he added, “PAM is led by a democratically minded type of left and 
I thought it useful to give it a boost. Then again,” he added, “unless the Greeks 
overcome their hysterical fear over communism, they will never be free.”48 
Impact of the Warsaw Pact Invasion 
Two weeks after Papandreou wrote those words, anti-communist fears 
in the West revived when Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia to 
halt what Moscow regarded to be its threatening slide towards capitalism. 
Dubček called on his people not to resist, resulting in a relatively easy, but by 
no means bloodless, occupation. Over the next months, a “normalization” 
process, undoing the reforms of the Prague Spring, would proceed apace, 
bringing the country back in line. Meanwhile in the West, the invasion 
alarmed America’s European allies, heavily dependent on US military forces 
for their defense, rallying them around NATO. 
Papandreou bemoaned the consequences of this abrupt revival of Cold-War 
tensions for the anti-junta struggle. “At the moment the situation in Greece 
looks pretty black,” he wrote to Sheinbaum on September 20. “The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia has squeezed out any possibility of a political solution. Just a 
few days ago, the State Department announced it was resuming all military aid 
to Greece, and I think they have decided to back the junta all the way.”49 In fact, 
Papandreou was mistaken in believing the US had officially announced the 
resumption of all military aid to Greece. Instead, the US had gotten its NATO 
partners to agree to a “one-time” resumption of heavy weapons deliveries to 
Greece frozen in the aftermath of the April coup.50 Official US resumption 
of military aid (and the unqualified American backing of the dictatorship it 
would signify) remained an open issue. Still, Papandreou was correct about 
the broader political impact of the Soviet move on East–West relations. 
Reanimating Cold-War fears, Communist Bloc intervention bolstered the 
argument that the Greek dictatorship was regrettable, but also necessary for 
the protection of American national security interests against the Soviets – and 
implicitly against politicians like Andreas Papandreou, whose politics before 
the April coup were seen as an emergent threat to those security interests.51 
48 Letter to Lianis, August 8, 1968, author archive.
49 Letter of September 20, 1968. Sheinbaum Collection.
50 Cf. Pelt, Tying Greece to the West, p. 294.
51 Cf. for example, Alexandros Nafpliotis, Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating 
the Junta in the Cold War, London: I. B. Tauris, 2013, pp. 37-38.
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The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia drove Papandreou to a new 
perspective on the Cold War and in particular on the diplomatic movement 
towards détente (or, in Soviet parlance, “peaceful coexistence”) that had 
gotten seriously underway after the superpowers stepped back from the 
brink of nuclear war at the climax of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Prior to 
the April coup, Papandreou saw the relaxation of East–West tensions under 
détente as a positive development, affording Greece the opportunity to hew 
a foreign policy more independent of US dictates, particularly in relation to 
Cyprus. In fact, the thaw in the Cold War had helped create the conditions 
for liberalization movements to take life in both Greece and Czechoslovakia. 
However, the American-backed Greek coup and the Soviet-led invasion 
of Czechoslovakia – each taking place without serious reprisals from the 
opposing camp – cast a different light on the rules governing “peaceful 
coexistence”. Those events inserted a restrictive corollary into the formula 
for détente, allowing for bloc-specific police actions, with each superpower 
permitting its rival to halt undesirable developments in countries belonging 
to its bloc. The invasion of Czechoslovakia thus crystallized for Papandreou 
a perspective on the “Greek problem” that interpreted it as a function of 
superpower dynamics on the European front of the Cold War. 
In December 1968, Papandreou had the opportunity to elaborate his new 
perspective at the level of policy analysis during a conference of American 
and European thinkers he attended at Princeton University in December. 
Papandreou’s participation was part of another month-long tour of North 
America, where he gave a number of lectures on Greece to university 
audiences in the American Midwest. The Canadian leg of the tour was 
organized by Nikos Skoulas, whom Papandreou had recently designated as 
the country’s PAK representative. A successful manager in the business world 
and a fiercely democratic Cretan, Skoulas had worked out a busy schedule for 
Papandreou in Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa that connected him with both 
Canadian politicians and Greek diaspora communities.
Held a month after Republican Richard Nixon’s victory in the US 
presidential elections, the Princeton conference was entitled “The United 
States, its Problems, Impact and Image in the World”.52 With participants 
52 Sponsored by the International Association for Cultural Freedom, the successor 
organization to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which was embroiled in controversy 
over revelations that it had been receiving covert CIA funding. Cf. Frances Stonor 
Saunders’ excellent study Who Paid the Piper?: CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London: 
Granta, 1999. The revealing book also covers more broadly the issue of CIA support for 
liberal anti-communism during the Cold War.
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from some twenty countries, the four-day event showcased the heated debates 
roiling Western intellectual circles over the American “arrogance of power” 
exemplified by the Vietnam War, as well as racial turmoil on the domestic 
front. The conference’s European co-chair was Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrieber, 
a French liberal whose best-selling book, The American Challenge, advocated 
a reformed Europe united to compete economically with the United States. 
(In 1970, Servan-Schreiber would secure Mikis Theodorakis’ exile from 
imprisonment in Greece.) 
The conference put Papandreou in the company of old friends and 
colleagues, many of whom were Kennedy-era intellectuals who had been part 
of his peer group when he departed to pursue his modernizing venture in 
Greece in 1963.53 At a panel discussion on US relations to Europe, Papandreou 
articulated his new perspective on the Cold War, a perspective congenial to 
the New Left critique that had put many American liberal intellectuals on the 
defensive. His views stood in sharp contrast to those of Stanley Hoffmann, 
a young Harvard international relations professor who proposed that the 
US adopt a policy of “selective disengagement” from Western Europe on 
the grounds that US over-commitment was fostering dependency. As if to 
confirm that concern, a West German political science professor rose to 
protest that a “continued strong presence of the United States in Europe” 
was essential to the continent’s security, irrespective of its political costs. 
Papandreou spoke against both positions. Predictably, he criticized the 
German professor for advocating a policy of unquestioning German deference 
to American interests. More interesting was his criticism of Hoffman, who, 
after all, was proposing a relaxation of America’s postwar hegemony. Andreas’ 
problem was not with the substance of Hoffmann’s proposal, but with its 
realism. Was it historically possible, he wondered, for the US to disengage 
selectively from Europe? Behind his skepticism was the question of how US 
foreign policy is determined. “For me this is fundamental. Policy requires a 
power propellant. Who are the people who make foreign policy in the United 
States? Is it the American citizenry? Congress? The President? I doubt it.”54 
53 These colleagues included the conference’s American co-chair Carl Kaysen (at whose 
home Andreas stayed), the organization’s new president, Shepard Stone (the former Ford 
Foundation official who had shepherded funding for Papandreou’s Center of Economic 
Research), as well as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and John Kenneth Galbraith. Also dropping 
by to rub shoulders with the assembled luminaries was a Papandreou acquaintance from 
Harvard University circles, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s choice for National Security Adviser.
54 This quotation and the following ones from Papandreou’s speech at the Princeton 
conference are from François Duchene (ed.), The Endless Crisis: America in the Seventies, 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970, pp. 236-237 passim. 
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In this, Papandreou was not breaking new ground. In his talk at the ADA 
event nine months earlier, he had already expressed the view that foreign 
policy decision-making was controlled by a “military-intelligence complex”, 
insulated from popular control. He now deepened that analysis and took it in 
a more radical direction. 
Papandreou cautioned, 
We should look carefully at the new alliance between the military, the 
intelligence services and the large economic interests, which is particularly 
evident in United States policy toward Latin America. It constitutes the 
social base of a new type of imperialism. Soviet bureaucratic socialism is 
not much different within its sphere of influence. The progressive forces 
released during the postwar period constitute a threat, real or imagined, 
to the interests of both superpowers, which have trampled upon them. 
Neutralist tendencies on both side of the Iron Curtain have turned into 
bloc-oriented behavior.
He then turned to the case of Greece: 
In 1947-48 the US stepped into Britain’s shoes in Greece by openly 
intervening there to “safeguard” Greek democracy, while the coalition 
regimes in Eastern Europe were converted into militant communist 
regimes with close ties to Moscow. The emergence of the NATO pact 
was countered by the emergence of the Warsaw Pact. In 1967, when 
Greece was on its way to becoming a democratic, progressive and 
sovereign country within NATO, the colonels associated with the CIA 
established a military dictatorship. A similar process of democratization 
and assertion of national sovereignty was underway in Czechoslovakia 
when the Warsaw Pact powers occupied the country.
Papandreou then introduced a distinction that signified his movement 
toward New Left neo-Marxism:
There are differences…in two respects between US and Soviet supremacy. 
One is that the Soviet Union lacks the techno-economic expansionism 
of the US military-industrial complex – the complex dynamic which, 
while propelling the world to new technological frontiers, is creating a 
new managerial élite beyond the reach of traditional levers of political 
authority over the bureaucracies. The other is that the Atlantic Alliance 
includes powerful advanced nations which are not dominated by the 
US in the same sense as the Latin-American republics. The pattern here 
is one of rapidly growing economic domination hand in hand with 
political infiltration and control.
Asserting that this pattern was “the reason for European concern over 
Greece”, Papandreou warned that “the US employed methods there that 
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it had so far not employed on the European continent. Greece, since the 
military takeover, has become a US satellite in the same sense that Bulgaria 
is a Russian satellite.” After dramatizing the threats to freedom and national 
sovereignty posed by the Cold War, he appealed for a European politics that 
would counter those threats: 
While there is time, the democratic progressive forces on the European 
Continent should join hands to face the new gathering storm. They 
must work for a free, united and peaceful Europe in which each nation 
is respected as an equal partner and each citizen respected by the 
state as an inviolable individual. When a united Europe emerges and 
masters its technological, economic and political potential, it be will 
able to define its relationship with both the US and the Soviet Union 
in a way which may well contribute to peace, progress and democracy 
in the world.
Papandreou’s analysis of the Cold War’s threat to Europe laid the basis 
for his appeals to political allies in Norway, Denmark, and Italy to raise the 
Greek issue within NATO. Those appeals had resonance in Western Europe, 
despite the “new impulse toward united action in NATO” generated by the 
“Czechoslovak crisis”, as a CIA intelligence report would put it.55 The enormous 
readership gained by Servan-Schreiber’s book on The American Challenge (it 
would be translated into 15 languages) demonstrated that West European 
publics were growing increasingly concerned about American domination. 
Europe’s desire to transcend postwar divisions, along with alienation from US 
policies in South-East Asia, had produced growing disaffection over relations 
with the transatlantic superpower, providing Papandreou’s arguments with an 
55 Cf., for instance, the CIA Intelligence Memorandum entitled “Current Problems in 
NATO” in James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook (eds), Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1969-1972, Vol. XLI, Washington, DC, 2000, document 1, Washington, January 21, 1969. 
According to the CIA analysts, “the Czechoslovak crisis generated a new impulse toward 
united action in NATO – symbolized by expanded consultation and the postponement of 
troop reductions. It has not, however, altered the European NATO members’ basic view 
that the danger of an all-out Soviet assault remains low. The allies therefore find themselves 
in a state of heightened activity and momentum that will be difficult to sustain so long as no 
new long-range goal or purpose is found. The chances for a meaningful NATO role in the 
continuing search for détente have been blighted by Moscow’s determination to maintain 
its grip in Eastern Europe. Thus the coming months are likely to see a growing paradox, in 
which the alliance actually works better while dissatisfaction about it increases. Meanwhile, 
the growing rivalries among the European members – for influence in Europe and in 
Washington – make it difficult for them to organize effectively for the larger collective role 
they believe they should play in the alliance.”
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audience. Indicatively, the year 1969 would officially inaugurate West German 
Ostpolitik, under the country’s new prime minister, Social Democrat Willy 
Brandt. Papandreou’s initial search for a “third road” beyond the rival Cold-
War blocs had led him, in the first instance, not to the Third World, but to 
Europe itself.
Nixon in Power 
Papandreou’s “Operation NATO” got underway in the context of a new 
administration in Washington. On January 20, 1969, Republican Richard 
Nixon was sworn in as the President of the United States. Opponents of 
the junta greeted the new administration with consternation, their dismay 
personified in the figure of Nixon crony Tom Pappas. Already under the 
Democrats, Pappas had played a nefarious role in bringing down the 1964-
1965 Center Union government. In the spring of 1966, he managed to secure 
a meeting with President Johnson in the Oval Office to lobby in support 
of the “apostate” Stephanopoulos government. Following the April coup, 
Pappas had assumed the role of unofficial middleman between the junta 
and the Democratic Johnson Administration. His well-documented role in 
securing a $549,000 contribution from the junta for Nixon’s 1968 Republican 
presidential campaign (and later in providing “hush funds” for Nixon’s 1972 
Watergate burglars) gave him clout in influencing Washington policies on 
behalf of the junta, as well as his own Greek investments.56 
Yet while Pappas was an unalloyed friend of the junta, he by no means 
managed the new administration’s relations with the dictatorship. Thanks to 
humiliating policy failure in Vietnam, Nixon took office amidst widespread 
skepticism and uncertainty around America’s global role and direction. 
Greece was only one of a welter of politically divisive issues facing Nixon and 
his tough-minded national security adviser, Henry Kissinger.57 The Greek 
issue required adroit management on a number of fronts. In Congress, an 
articulate cohort of liberal lawmakers had adopted the termination of military 
56 His activities are widely documented. For an interesting report from the period, cf. 
“The Greek for Go-Between”, Time (14 February 1969). 
57 In his first three months as president, Nixon, at the behest of Kissinger, ordered 56 
NSSMs (National Security Study Memorandums), essentially policy reviews on major issues 
facing the US around the globe. These included NSSM 52 on “Military Aid Policy for Greece”, 
issued by Nixon on April 26, 1969. Sent to the secretaries of state and defense and the CIA 
Director, the NSSM asked the recipients to “include an assessment of the present political 
situation in Greece as it affects US interests”; Miller, Selvage and Van Hook (eds), Foreign 
Relations, Vol. XXIX, document 246, April 26, 1969.
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aid to the junta as one of the issues in their campaign to rein in the “Imperial 
Presidency”. Overseas, the European Commission on Human Rights was 
investigating charges that the junta was using torture against political 
detainees, the beginnings of a process that would culminate in December 
1969 with Greece’s withdrawal (once it realized that expulsion was certain) 
from the Council of Europe. Moreover, Norway and Denmark, soon to be 
joined by Italy, were coming under pressure from their own voters to take a 
stand against the junta within NATO. 
As an intellectually sophisticated policy analyst, Papandreou was skeptical 
that these pockets of dissent could become powerful enough to overturn 
Pentagon support for the regime. Yet as a political man, Papandreou was 
under the pragmatic imperative to exhaust any still-open margins for action 
that circumstances afforded. Terminating military aid, while not enough to 
overthrow the regime, would have been no small matter.58 Sending a powerful 
message that the US was abandoning support for the regime, it would have 
been a severe psychological and political blow to the junta, likely triggering 
actions in Greece and in Europe to further isolate the regime. 
Over the next two years, Papandreou carried on the fight within North 
America and Western Europe in a virtual marathon of public appearances 
and in camera meetings with politicians, while continuing, on a covert 
basis, to organize for resistance within Greece. To be sure, he was not 
alone in lobbying on this issue, although no other Greek émigré invested 
as much energy and resources in the effort; nor was any Greek politician 
better positioned or willing to exercise their influence with NATO countries 
(Karamanlis having chosen a different strategy for ousting the junta focused 
on appeals to the Greek officer corps). Propaganda and lobbying in exile 
met with some success. Indicatively, the US Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs made the following observations on European attitudes 
toward “possible resumption” of military aid ahead of a critical May 1970 
NATO ministerial meeting: 
Feeling concerning Greece in Western Europe runs deep and hot 
in most Western European countries except Spain and Portugal. 
Sentiments hostile to the present Greek Government spread over the 
entire spectrum of political opinion in the Western Europe democratic 
countries; it is particularly intense among Social Democrats, intellectuals 
and young people. None in high public positions in these countries 
58 To be sure, cutting off military aid was, from a military standpoint, of little significance. 
As the State Department informed Nixon on October 7, 1969, grant military aid had actually 
shown a “significant increase over the pre-coup levels”; Miller and Van Hook (eds), Foreign 
Relations, Vol. XLI, Draft Memorandum for the President, document 257, October 7, 1969.
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can risk supporting the regime publicly, and many increasingly feel 
constrained by public pressures to openly oppose it.59
“Operation NATO” fell short of its objectives. However, it did create enough 
political obstacles to force the Administration to postpone implementing 
President Nixon’s July 1969 decision to resume military aid to the junta until 
September 22, 1970, keeping that decision a secret, not only from the public, 
but from NATO defense and foreign ministers. 
Epilogue
Following the official resumption of military aid, the Nixon Administration 
pursued an increasingly cozy relationship with the junta, ultimately sending 
Papandreou in the direction of Third World revolutionary politics. In the 
words of James Edward Miller, an adjunct professor at the US Foreign Service 
Institute and one of Papandreou’s most virulent critics, 
The Nixon Administration’s unwavering backing for the junta […] 
would provide a convincing validation of Andreas Papandreou’s 
version of history, reinforce his claim to power, and ultimately open the 
way for precisely the sort of political solution to Greece’s problems that 
Americans of all political persuasions had feared: a Greek government 
pursuing an anti-NATO agenda while cozying up to the Soviet bloc and 
radical regimes in the Third World.60
While Miller’s understanding of the actual content of Papandreou’s politics 
is questionable, it is notable that, in a backhanded way, Miller’s critique of 
Nixon’s policies validates Papandreou’s path towards political radicalism. 
Asked in March 1971 by The Harvard Crimson what sort of government he 
envisioned for Greece, Papandreou acknowledged the distance he had traveled: 
It was said long ago by the Sulzbergers and others that if allowed, 
I would take Greece out of NATO, and I would throw the king out, 
that I was a socialist. Well, at the time, I was not. I was a progressive 
gentleman, but not in that sense. At this point, I’m quite prepared to 
do all those nasty things.61
Political analyst and historian, 
Ph.D. in Political Science, York University, Canada
59 Ibid., Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
(Hillenbrand) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs (Davies), document 276, April 22, 1970.
60 Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece, pp. 155-156.
61 The Harvard Crimson (29 March 1971).
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